A Gender Perspective Approach Regarding the Impact of Income Tax on Wage-Earning Women in Spain 1
In several countries special attention has been paid to comparing the impact of fiscal reforms on men and women. As the choice of tax regime is important for the goals set up by society and if one of them is to increase labour supply among women "then is also important to analyse the design of the tax policy as well as the tax levels form a gender perspective" as Asa Löfström (2001) stated. This paper will provide an approach of the way in which the changes in the Personal Income Tax (PIT) in Spain, since the Transition to Democracy after Franco's Dictatorship, has affected men and women with regard to their specific position in the labour market.
There is no doubt, however, that direct taxation and, specifically, Personal Income Tax in Spain can be seen as a paradigmatic case of indirect discrimination in the form of fiscal discrimination. In theory, direct taxation is irreproachably neutral, and taxpayers' sex or gender characteristics have no bearing on this form of taxation. However, this is not the case when the fiscal regime is not individual, because some taxpayers benefit and some lose, depending on their marital status and / or the type of family to which they belong (Barnet and Grown 2004) . In fact, in the European Union, non-individualized compulsory tax regimes may penalize the following groups: people living together as partners, one-parent fami lies (where mothers are more often than fathers are the sole parent) and nonheterosexual relationships. At the same time, these regimes favour the traditional two-parent family with one income earner, as Maria Wersig (2009) points out for Germany. One flagrant example of indirect discrimination under these regimes can be seen in the case of income being accumulated and reported by the family unit. This results in the income of the secondary earner being taxed at the marginal rate of the primary earner, and this rate is always higher than the one that would be applied to the secondary earner's income, if that secondary earner made an independent tax return. This method of reporting taxes was compulsory in Spain until 1989 and, regrettably, is still optional in spite of the fact that the European Commission (EC) (1982) , in its first community action program for equal opportunities between men and women, stated that one of its major goals would be to "individualize social and fiscal rights". This, the EC said, would ena-1 This is part of a research financed by the Instituto de la Mujer and has been done in collaboration with Ignacio Ferrari for data processing.
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In order to prevent all possible fiscal harassment, it is therefore essential to seek answers to the many questions regarding this matter − such as the following: Are compulsory taxes based on a gender-biased, masculine model? Do tax benefits exclusively favour individuals who are legally married or may they be extended to all types of families, including one-parent families and non-heterosexual life partners? Which type of family receives greater tax benefits? Does fiscal neutrality exist from the perspective of marital status and gender?
The purpose of this paper, however, is much more restricted, as it focuses on the gender disparities observed in wages in the labour market. It attempts to fos ter discussion, in the case of Spain, concerning the way that income tax is desig ned and concerning other possible options that would make employment more attractive, in order to increase female participation in the labour market and reduce other gender disparities. The first section explains the principal characteristics of Spanish income tax and its evolution in recent years. During this period, two clearly different facts have emerged. The first demonstrates that there has been an important increase in the number of taxpayers from 1975 to 2004 (the last year in which it is possible to look up fiscal statistics broken down by gender, forcing all studies to focus on this one year), and the second verifies the high proportion (80 per cent) represented by incomes from waged work in the total amount of taxable income. The second section analyses gender asymmetric distribution in the Spanish labour market that reflects the real percentage of people at each income level (even though differences in labour income refer not only to wages, but also to other incomes, such as contributory pensions and unemployment benefits). In the third section, the marginal rates of the Personal Income Tax (PIT) are superimposed onto the density function diagram, in an attempt to reveal the effect of taxation rates on different levels of income. This diagram sheds light on the proportion of men and women affected by the differing marginal rates applied in Spain, revealing where differing rates are concentrated and consequently showing how men and women are affected by lower or higher marginal rates. The fourth section briefly presents the results obtained in the various parts of the study.
General Characteristics of the Spanish Tax System
Personal Income Tax, in its present form, was created when Spain changed to a democratic system of government and had its specific origin in the tax reform initiated on November 14, 1977, as part of the Tax Reform Emergency Measures Law 50 / 1977. This was the result of the Moncloa Pacts established in October 1977 by the government and almost all political parties to set the basic shape of economic and social policy during political transition with a framework of policy on pay, employment and social security. The reform had three phases, related to tax administration, direct taxation and indirect taxation, respectively. In addition, the reformers aimed to implement a modern tax regime that would harmonize with already existing systems in the European Economic Community (EEC) by including a value-added tax (VAT) − a key tax element as regards Spain's entry into the EEC, which came about on January 1, 1986.
Personal Income Tax, which became law in Spain on September 8, 1978, was initially conceived as a uniform tax, which treated all incomes identically, regardless of their nature and origin. It was considered to be personal, since it allowed deductions for those who paid, not only in proportion to their financial situation, but also in relation to their personal and family circumstances (Article 1 of Law 44 / 1978). The tax unit was considered to be the family unit, with all the latter's components being jointly and severally subject to the tax (Article 4.2.). More over, capital gains and yields of all members of the family unit, whatever the financial regime of the husband and wife may be, were to accumulate (Article 7.1.3.).
Those who passed this legislation did not foresee the problems that accumulated taxation would cause from the perspective of gender, since they defined the family unit as being made up of a married couple and legitimate, legitimized, natural, recognized or adopted children who were still underage (Article 5.1.1.). Furthermore, one-parent family units were defined as those that resulted from "marriages being annulled or dissolved or from legal separations" (cases of divorce were not recognized, as this was not yet legal) and those where single fathers or mothers had underage children in their care.
Throughout the 30 years since it was implemented, the PIT has undergone changes, especially as a result of the Constitutional Court's verdict of February 20, 1989, whereby compulsory joint taxation was deemed unconstitutional. This verdict meant that the PIT had to be modified and converted into an optional tax, so that individuals within a family would have the choice of filing either a joint tax return with the other members of the family unit or an individual return. As a result, family tax returns are still valid and affect a large number of taxpayers because the proportion of joint tax returns remains high, at over 30.19 per cent (that is, one in three tax returns filed are joint returns), as Table 1 shows. 2   2   Table 1 is based on tax returns filed in the Common Fiscal Territory (CFT), that is, the entire Spanish state, or all the Spanish Autonomous Communities apart from the Basque Country and the Navarre Autonomous Communities, as both have special autonomy agreements on taxation. Labour income accounts for 79.6 per cent of the incomes declared, followed by self-employed and professional income (including agricultural businesses, professionals and small businesses) at 8.4 per cent and capital gains at 4.9 per cent. Interest and dividend income accounts for 3.4 per cent, with real estate income at 2.0 per cent. The relative insignificance of other income (at 1.7 per cent) is noteworthy. This category includes transparencia fiscal 3 and earnings from patrimonial and professional companies, etc. The high proportion of income derived from labour is not unique to the Spanish income tax system: it is common to all tax regimes in developed countries. However, the quantitative importance of this category is not uniform for all those who declare taxable income because it varies according to amount of income. At both extremes − that is, in the sections corresponding to the lowest and highest incomes − labour incomes make up a smaller proportion of total income than in the other sections. For those who earn between 12,000 Euros and 51,000 Euros in taxable income, labour income represents more than 80 per cent of all income declared, but beyond this threshold, the relative weight of labour income decreases until it reaches its lowest point, just 17.9 per cent in the highest bracket (More than 600,000 Euros). In the highest brackets, the significance of income from investments, capital gains and professional activities may be detected. In contrast, in the lower income brackets, yields from self-employed activities have greater relevance (including income from shops and from personal services).
Gender Asymmetric Income Distribution and Differing Impacts of Personal Income Tax on Men and Women in Spain
Analysing the differing impact personal income tax has on men and women is not an easy task, due to the lack of taxation statistics broken down by gender, which would reveal this discrimination. Some advances have been made, however, by the Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria and the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, which have been working together to elaborate on a sample with multiple data about payers of income tax (Muestra IRPF 2002 IEF-AEAT, contribuyentes). The sample consists of almost a million items selected through a random statistics system, which includes three different categories of information: territorial (provinces), level of income and the type of tax return selected by taxpayers (individual or joint return). This sample opens a great range of possibilities for gender studies on taxation.
Unfortunately, the data are not yet completely broken down by sex. Individual taxpayers and one-parent families can be identified easily, but taxpayers who 3 The Spanish Income Tax Law considers that, under some circumstances and to avoid fraud, some corporations are regarded as non-existent, and their profits are directly attributed to its shareholders. choose joint tax returns are not readily identifiable. In these cases, the situation is quite complex, especially because it is impossible for researchers to discover the amount of income that individual family members have contributed to total family income, as this information is lacking. Furthermore, until recently, only those legally married were allowed to choose between a joint or an individual tax return. But it can be observed that in many cases, there is only one earner (breadwinner family model) or the level of income contributed by the secondary earner is irrelevant. To consider the economic rationality in choosing individual or joint tax returns for different kinds of families, see the study published by Villota et al. (2008) .
This sample constitutes a fundamental source of statistics for analysing personal labour income distribution, as it allows for an analysis broken down by autonomous community and by province. Statistical use of this source is vital for the completion of the picture of income distribution that is currently available to us. The only drawback this data may have is that it is restricted exclusively to taxpayers who are affected by common tax regulations. The geographical area it covers is called the "Common Fiscal Territory", and it comprises the totality of the Spanish state, but it excludes the Basque Country and the Navarre Autonomous Community, which are subject to autonomous tax regulations. Nevertheless, these statistics are a useful complement to the information supplied by the National Institute of Statistics. Similar data in other countries constitute the main source of information on wages. In France, for instance, since 1950, data has been available concerning the starting and finishing dates of work carried out by taxpayers, along with their working conditions. The sample of income tax for the year 2004 has been used as the basis of Table 2 , which shows the distribution of labour income for 15 autonomous communities in Spain (note that Spanish income tax considers as "labour income" not only wages and salaries but also contributory pensions and unemployment benefits). First, the great disproportion between the number of females and males in the labour market must be highlighted, since the former make up only 38.1 per cent of the total (5,638,193 / 14,809,717 ) as compared to men, who make up 61.9 per cent of that total (9,171,524 / 14,809,717) − that is, there are almost twice as many men as women participating in the labour market. Some of those included in the firsts brackets of income (0 -6000 and 6000 -12000 Euros) may have held jobs with an atypical legal workday (i. e. parttime work), as the legal wage limit would not have permitted paying such low wage for a full day's work. These lower figures might also be attributable to payment received for a full-time job that was performed over a period of time shorter than a year − either sporadically and intermittently over this period or seasonally, owing to the kind of activity (agricultural or tourism, etc) performed. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the number and proportion of women is higher at the lower income levels, while it is possible to detect a greater male concentration in the income over 12,000 Euros. In addition, high incomes are earned mostly by males (260.947 men, as opposed to 43.785 women, had in comes higher than 60,000 Euros ), which means that nine out of ten income earners in this band are men. Considering data included in Table 2 , it is possible to state that almost half (47.79 per cent) of all women paying income tax earned less than 12.000 Euros per year and even 18.54 per cent less than the legal minimum wage (probably they have jobs as temporary or part time workers). Meanwhile for men this proportion is only 27.49 per cent, what shows an important gender gap of 20 percentage points.
The Impact of Income Tax Changes on Women's Labour Income
This asymmetric distribution, from a gender perspective, may be seen more clearly in the density function diagram (proportion of men and women earning some amount of Euros) shown in Figure 2 . The curve representing women's labour income (black bars) is above the one for men (grey bars) for incomes below 10,500 Euros. But beyond this level, the line representing women's income does not go above the line representing men's income again, except for some isolated peaks, specifically at 27,350 Euros and 27,650 Euros. This is due to the large number of women who have found jobs as professionals in the public sector in recent years, and whose salaries match their status. 4 At the upper income levels, the line representing men's labour income is always higher than the line for women. Figure 2 highlights the fact that women receive much lower incomes than men, in absolute terms and proportionally, and it reveals that the overall number of women participating in the labour market is lower than the number of men. The gender asymmetric distribution of income in labour market originates that the first marginal rates of the Personal Income Tax (PIT) will affect a higher proportion of women than men. Consequently, it may be stated unequivocally that any change in taxation that alters the lower bands of the tax scale will affect women to a greater degree, and if tax is reduced in the lower bands, women will experience less tax pressure.
By superimposing the PIT taxation scale on the density function diagram as can be shown in this figure, it is possible to obtain a complete picture of the impact of these rates of taxation on men and women. It shows clearly the proportion of men and women affected by the different marginal rates − applied to the current rate in Spain − where women are concentrated in the lower marginal rates of 0 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, while men outstrip women proportionally in the remaining taxation sections. Source: Author's own representation of data from Muestra IRPF 2004 IEF-AEAT, declarantes 0-300 3600-3900 7200-7500 10800-11100 14400-14700 18000-18300 21600-21900 25200-25500 28800-29100 32400-32700 36000-36300 39600-39900 43200-43500 46800-47100 50400-50700 54000-54300 57600-57900
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Spanish fiscal reforms after Franco's dictatorship
The above analysis allows us to observe the impact of the latest PIT reforms on male and female workers. To date, all changes made to PIT rates in Spain, from their original design in 1979 to the present day, have been implemented without consideration of their gender impact. The effects of these changes on the amount of tax collected have been analysed, as has the distribution of the tax burden among taxpayers, but the tax burden distribution has been seen as neutral because taxation is not usually viewed from a gender perspective. Nevertheless, marginal rates have undergone continual changes throughout the lifecycle of the PIT, as shown in the following table, which indicates the minimum and maximum marginal rates for the years 1979 to 2007. Another vital aspect regarding the tax unit, or persons liable for payment of PIT, must not be overlooked. The fact is that until 1988 it was compulsory to file tax returns jointly in Spain. It is therefore extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure the impact of lower rates of taxation on married women, as the latter were bound by the marginal rate of the principal breadwinner who was almost always the husband. The influence of the variation in the lower marginal rate impacting all taxpayers, but it had the greatest effect on women because the reduction of the tax burden affected those with lower incomes proportionately more, and here is where there are concentrated more women than men.
In Table 3 , a sharp drop may be observed in the minimum marginal rate in 1985 which undoubtedly led to a reduction in tax liability for taxpayers with reduced incomes and this would apply particularly to single, divorced or widowed women workers. In contrast, in 1988 -the first year that saw an application of the Constitutional Court's ruling that compulsory joint tax returns were unconstitu-tional (Ruling of February 20, 1989 ) -, the minimum rate rose to 25 per cent (representing an increase of 17 percentage points over the previous year), while the maximum marginal rate rose by 10 points, to 56 per cent. This extreme increase in rates resulted from the fear that the introduction of optional taxation might result in less tax being collected. The minimum rate of 25 per cent was maintained until 1992, when it was reduced to 20 per cent, and it remained unchanged until 1999, when the 1998 PIT reform was applied. This reform has undergone some slight modifications until year 2006, one of which was the reduction of the minimum marginal rate to 15 per cent in 2003 (Law 46 / 2002 . When the socialist party returned to power it made another PIT reform in 2006 (applied in 2007) , which worsened women's disposal income because the first marginal rate was increased by nine percentage points, leaving it at 24 per cent (the 15 per cent marginal tax rate was suppressed); even though the basic allowances rose considerably affecting positively many of them (from 3.400 Euros to 5.050 Euros). The taxpayers who benefited most, however, were those with the highest incomes, since the maximum marginal rate was reduced again, from 45 to 43 per cent Under the rule of conservative party, Law 40 / 1998, which was passed on January 1, 1999, and remained in force until 2003 without any significant change, profoundly reformed the PIT and dismantled the basic tax scheme that had been valid for 20 years by converting tax credits for personal and family reasons to allowances and replacing the ‚zero rate band' of the tax schedule with an allowance in taxable income called a ‚personal minimum'. There is no doubt that those changes are regressive from the point of view of social equity, as they generate a tax reduction which increases with income level. The personal minimum proved to be arbitrary and discriminatory from a gender perspective, as it discriminated against one-parent families (the majority of which have women as their heads) as compared to twoparent families and also because it eliminated the tax credit that favoured mothers with children under the age of three doing paid work outside the home.
It must be underlined, however, that Law 40 / 1998 improved women's tax situation and the first marginal rate was decreased by two percentage points, leaving it at 18 per cent, and the next level was increased by one point (from 23 to 24 per cent). But really the taxpayers who benefited most, however, were those with the highest incomes, since the maximum marginal rate was drastically reduced, from 56 to 48 per cent, as Table 3 shows.
The latest PIT reform, which was applied in year 2007 (Law 35 / 2006) , is rather difficult to evaluate rigorously as the last fiscal data available (fundamental to carry out the study) refers to the year 2006. Consequently, I have been obliged to elaborate the table below (Table 4) 
Conclusions
Given the persistence of patriarchal relations in Spain, the traditional gendered division of labour shapes the Spanish labour market, thus maintaining and even exacerbating the asymmetrical distribution of domestic work, as Lina Galvez et al. (2011) pointed out. As a result, variations in the minimum marginal income tax rate predominantly affect women, while any change in the highest marginal rates affect men to a greater degree, as they have higher incomes. Consequently, it can be said that any tax reform that reduces the highest marginal rates in the tax scale has a definite gender impact and clearly benefits men. This was the effect of the reform brought about by Law 40 / 1998. Conversely, the tax modification introduced in Law 46 / 2002, which lowered the minimum tax rate from 18 to 15 per cent, positively affected a higher proportion of women than men by reducing their tax burden. This also had the potential of making women's contribution to paid work more attractive and therefore motivating them to participate in the labour market. Although a number of issues still need to be addressed if Spain and Europe are to move toward complete gender equality. For example, measures need to be taken to deal with the issue of women's predominance in the lower tax brackets and with the fact that women in many European countries still do more daily domestic work than men. For instance, macroeconomic policies, including fiscal policy, should also be designed to prevent the persistent asymmetrical division of remunerated and non-remunerated work between genders that still exists in many European countries.
